

INTEREST GROUPS

		Status vis-à-vis Pri	
		Within	Outside
Effective Control and/or Cooptation by the State	Yes	Urban labor Peasants	Military
	Somewhat	Popular	Media
	No		Private Sector

- **Labor (CTM)**

- 1915 -Obregon promoted Casa del Obrero Mundial and Luis Morones as leader.
- CROM - Mexican Regional Worker's Confed. - 1918-28 - Morones and CROM close to Calles and Obregon, but Morones threatens to run against Obregon in 1928 and government support withdrawn.
- CGOCCM - Gral. Confed. of Workers and Peasants - headed by Vicente Lombardo Toledano - 1928 split from CROM -soon became largest confed. - favored by Cardenas.
- 1935 - CGOCCM -----> CTM - Mexican Worker's Confed.
- 1938 - under PRM, labor 1 of 4 sectors.
- 4 strategies of subordination
 - Divide and Rule – splits, ousters, and challenges to CTM
 - Casa del Obrero Mundial – 1915 (Morones)CROM - 1918
 - CGOCCM - 1928 (Lombardo Toledano)
 - 1935: CTM (Fidel Velasquez)
 - Oil Workers Union - 210,000 members. Pemex accounts for 40% of state revenue, 25% of state spending, 40% of X earnings, 10% of GNP. Pemex pays union 2% of the value of all sub-contracts. Many sub-contracted cos. are union owned cos. - union assigns 40% of sub-contracts. 10% deduction on union members' paychecks to pay for "revolutionary works" (from funeral parlors to shampoo production). Pemex pays all active and retired workers \$16/month to spend in union stores. Union decides on who gets what jobs in Pemex and can fire workers. In Oct. 89 under new boss, union gave up 2% commission on contracts, \$16/month store coupon, and right to assign sub-contracts.
 - Cooptation - benefits to unions - labor leaders to party and government posts - government subsidies to unions - many public social programs just for union labor.
 - Control - deny legal status - rule out strikes, impose settlements - remove leaders - intimidation by thugs, etc. - imprisonment.

- Corruption - buy jobs, labor peace - Petro workers' union ex-union controls jobs, sub-contracts, commissions.
- **Ag-Peasants (CNC)**
 - Received least benefit - provide most support for PRI
 - 2 factors in history of peasant organs: 1) ruling coalition determined to separate urban and rural labor and 2) intolerance of independent peasant organizations.
 - Many peasant leagues formed in 1920s.
 - Cardenas - ag. reform and incorporation of peasant leagues into party. Collectivized ejidos were the form of ag. prod. and a source of institutionalized support for the party. 1910 - 97% of land owned by 830 people - estimated 3.5 million peasants were landless. By 1970 - nearly 2.9 million people owned land - over 200 million acres has been redistributed. But there was little interest in total productivity. And there remained 4.5 million landless peasants (mostly day laborers - young sons of ejidatarios). Ejidos (communal land) owned about 40% of the land. 18,000 ejidos: 14,000 worked on basis of usufructuary rights (which can be taken away) given to individual peasants (ejidatarios). 4,000 operated collectively (mostly in the south). Estimated 1.86 million parcels of ejido land being worked individually with average size of 16 acres (maximum size is 25 acres). 960,000 private farmers working on average farm size of 100 hectares (247 acres). These are usually, but not always, free from expropriation. 40,000 farms over 250 acres and 500 farms over 125,000 acres.
 - 1938 - CNC (National Peasant Confed.) created by Cardenas - split from CTM - sector of PRM. Peasants depend upon CNC for land and resources.
 - Cooptation and control of peasants.
 - Lombardo Toledanos efforts to independently organize peasants never legally recognized.
 - Ruben Jaramillo-Morales - violent efforts to expose corruption in ejidos - the given amnesty to work in new leftist group - frustrated, turned to extralegal land invasions - killed 1962.
 - Continuing land invasions are either co-opted or repressed by military.
 - Rural guerrillas operating in state of Guerrero in late 60s and 70s. Lucio Cabanas leader. Attacks on garrisons. Kidnapped senator (and gub. nominee) and Ech's father-in-law. Cabanas killed in 1974.
- **Popular Sector**
 - No roots to the Revolt. But has gained most rewards. Includes government employees, small entrepreneurs, professionals, etc. - the m-c.
 - CNOP - National Confederation of Popular Organs. - encompasses all of this sector.
 - FSTSE (Fed. of Unions of Workers in the Service of the State) is heart and soul. Created 1938 as charter member of PRM. (NOP not created until 1943.) FSTSE

not put in CTM as part of divide and rule strategy. Teachers make up 1/2 of FSTSE. FSTSE - largest single component of organized labor.

- Political leverage for pop. sector - Pri wants to keep bureaucrats happy - needs their expertise.
- Most highly educated and politically astute.
- Most autonomous sector - no legal code linking it to government such as Ag Code or Labor Law.

- **Military**

- Depoliticized by 1940s - process begun by Obregon who wanted to tame the caudillos and essentially finished by Cardenas who wanted to show his independence from Calles and his generals. Struggles, rebellions, and purges eliminated most old-line revolution generals - younger generals more professional.
- Institutions to rival the military - armed peasants, Red Batallions, and especially the party.
- Cardenas' important accomplishment was depol. military. As War Minister he had stressed prof. Continued to do so as pres. Put military PRM to control it. Split War Ministry into 2: Defense and Navy. Purged most pol. members.
- Candidacy of General Almazas against Cardenas' Secretary of War Avila Camacho was last gasp of old-line generals. Avila Camacho was last military president.
- Depol. maintained by rotating assignments to prevent building base of support, promoting most loyal officers, allowing military elite to enrich themselves through graft.
- Enhanced significance in 70s and 80s - concerns over internal and external security. 1968, rural guerrillas, economic crisis and concern over political order, drugs, insuring Pri elected victories.
- Gua. refugees in S.
- Defense budget, size, equipment have greatly expanded in recent years.

- **Media**

- Constraints
 - Financial - control newsprint through PIPSA. Govt. ads (20% of total revenues). Bribery - direct payments to reporters, give jobs to reporters, buy news columns.
 - Secrecy of news makers.
 - Linkages between state and media. (Private newspapers owned by lg. businessmen who tend to be uncritical of state.)
 - Television overwhelmingly pro-business and pro-govt.
 - State issues licenses for broadcasters.
 - Physical harassment, especially toward left.
 - Por Que? - 68-78 ultra-leftists. Pipsa denied better newsprint. Government ads cut off. Army raided offices.
 - Excelsior - 1976 - NYT of LA. Relationship with Ech deteriorated. Govt. attacked Excelsior as unpatriotic in other media outlets. Invasion of parcel of Excelsior land. Forced assembly of the Excelsior cooperative where Scherer team was ousted.

- Manual Buendia killed May 1984.
 - Freedom (outweigh limitations?)
 - Multitude of outlets exist (from left to right). Scherer went on to found Proceso - Uno Mas Uno Jornada after Excelsior purge.
 - University publications are leftist outlet - other intellectual outlets.
 - Political satire of cartoonist Rius.
- **Private Sector**
 - Semi-official status to chambers.
 - Obligatory membership.
 - State approval of leaders, etc.
 - State seldom intervenes, however.
 - Guaranteed rep. a plus.
 - Concamin - Confed. of Ind. Ch.
 - Concanaco - Confed. of National Ch. of Commerce
 - Canacintra - National Chamber of Manu. Inds. "Captive group". Formed in early 40s along with protectionist leg.
 - Private associations:
 - Coparmex - Mexican Employers Confederation
 - CMHN - Mexican Council of Businessmen
 - CCE - Entrep. Coordinating Council
 - Reaction to bank national in September 1982 example of autonomy.
 - Private sector highly critical, even of Pri and political system.
 - Pri threatens chambers, but nothing happened.
 - DLM allowed 1/3 of bank stocks to be sold to public.